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SOUTH CAROLINA V GATHERS.
PROHIBITING THE USE OF VICTIM-
RELATED INFORMATION IN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
PROCEEDINGS
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prescribes im-
posing a sentence that is both fair and reasonable: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."' In interpreting the eighth amendment, the United States
Supreme Court has required that a sentence be based on objective informa-
tion and be proportional to the defendant's moral culpability. Thus, courts
review sentencing decisions to ensure that the information on which the
judge or jury relies is objective, and the sentence proportional, in accordance
with the eighth amendment.2
In the context of capital punishment, the Court has articulated a distinct
standard for the imposition of sentences. Specifically, the Court has stated
that a judge or jury should impose a death sentence based only on reason,
and not emotion.' Capital sentences must be individualized and based on
information that relates to the defendant's "personal responsibility and
moral guilt."' Imposition of a capital sentence that does not meet this strict
criteria violates the eighth amendment and its prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.5 Therefore, courts must thoroughly analyze informa-
tion that the sentencer considers, particularly in capital punishment proceed-
ings, to ensure that it complies with the eighth amendment.
To arrive at an individualized sentencing determination, the sentencer
must consider information specifically related to the crime committed. 6 Ex-
amining the victim impact statement is one means by which the sentencer
can gain such information. Victim impact statements contain information
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890-91 (1983). See generally Nevares-Muniz, The
Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of Weighted Punishments, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 272 (1984) (proposing that the legislatures create a scale for the severity of crimes and
the appropriate punishments).
3. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
4. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156-58 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982); see infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
5. Zant, 462 U.S. at 884-85.
6. See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
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describing the identity and characteristics of the victim and the effect of the
crime on the victim and the victim's family." The purpose of these state-
ments is to allow the victim to participate more meaningfully in the prosecu-
tion of the defendant.' Congress called for the inclusion of victim impact
statements in presentence reports with the passage of the Victim and Wit-
ness Protection Act of 1982.' Currently, similar legislation mandating the
inclusion of such statements in presentence reports exists in most states and
the District of Columbia.1 o
The Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of a victim impact state-
ment in a capital punishment proceeding as a means of describing the vic-
tim's character in Booth v. Maryland. " Specifically, the Court held that the
7. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
8. See McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 505 (1986);
see also Note, Victim Impact Statements and Restitution: Making the Punishment Fit the Vic-
tim, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 301 (1984) (discussing the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982 and burdens of proof with respect to restitution).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3146(a), 3579, 3580 (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D).
10. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.022 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-253(4) (Supp.
1989), 13-702(D)(9) (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-65-109 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1(West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 54-91a (West 1985), 54-91c (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4331
(Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-103a (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306(b) (Supp.
1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-3-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1990); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-1-8 to 1-9 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3(5)
(West 1979 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4604(2) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(B) (West
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1257 (Supp. 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-
609(c)(3) (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 4B, ch. 258B, § 3(h) (West Supp. 1990);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 771.14 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61 IA.037-.038 (West
Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-151 to 19-159 (Supp 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 217.762 (Vernon 1990): MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-112, 46-18-242 (1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2261 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176-145(3) (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 651:4-a (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-24-5 (1990); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(3) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-825(9) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.12, 2947.051 (Baldwin
1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.530(2),
144.790(2) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3 (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-
28-3, -4, -4.1 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-1.1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-207 (8), -209(b) (1982 & Supp.
1990); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-
20(1)(e) (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (Supp. 1987), tit. 28, § 204(e) (1986); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.69.020(4), .030 (Supp. 1990);
W. VA. CODE §§ 61-1 IA-2, -3, -6 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 950.04(2m), .05(1)(dm) (West
Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 7-13-303(a)(iv)-(v) (1987); Comment, The Relevance of Victim
Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 n.12
(1988).
11. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). For a full discussion of the case see infra text accompanying
notes 86-136.
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statement was not admissible during the sentencing phase of a capital pun-
ishment proceeding because the statement might lead the jury to render a
capricious or emotional decision.' 2 In Booth, however, the Court left un-
resolved the issue of whether all victim-related information was admissible
by stating that the inadmissibility of victim impact statements did not auto-
matically exclude victim-related information and that victim-related infor-
mation might be admissible when it "relate[s] directly to the circumstances
of the crime."' 3 An example of such information is an object found at the
scene of the crime that provides information about the victim's character.
To resolve the issue of the admissibility of victim-related information during
the sentencing phase of a capital punishment proceeding, the Court granted
certiorari in South Carolina v. Gathers. "4
In Gathers, the General Sessions Court of Charleston County, South Car-
olina, convicted and sentenced Demetrius Gathers to death for the murder
and criminal sexual assault of Richard Haynes. 5 During the sentencing
phase of the trial, the prosecution read to the jury the contents of a prayer
card and referred to a voter registration card which were found on the vic-
tim.' 6 One of the grounds on which Gathers appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina was that the prosecution's reading of the
prayer card and reference to the voter registration card violated Gathers'
eighth amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.' 7 Specifi-
cally, Gathers based his eighth amendment appeal on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Booth v. Maryland, which held that the use of
victim impact statements during the sentencing phase of capital punishment
proceedings violated the defendant's eighth amendment rights. 8 Gathers
contended that, by reading the contents of the prayer card and referring to
the voter registration card before the jury during the sentencing phase, the
prosecution focused "extensively on the personal characteristics of the vic-
tim" rather than on the defendant."'
12. Id. at 508-09. A majority of five Justices decided Booth. Justices Powell, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens constituted the majority, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia dissented. Id. at 497, 515.
13. Id. at 507 n. 10. The Court stated, "Our disapproval of victim impact statements at
the sentencing phase of a capital case does not mean, however, that this type of information
will never be relevant in any context. Similar types of information may well be admissible
because they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime." Id.
14. 488 U.S. 888 (1988).
15. State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 478, 369 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1988).
16. Id. at 482-83, 369 S.E.2d at 143-44.
17. Id.
18. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
19. State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. at 482, 369 S.E.2d at 143.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the prosecu-
tion's reading of the victim-related information, the prayer card, and the
reference to the voter registration card during the sentencing phase of the
trial violated Gathers' constitutional rights.2" The court based its decision
on Booth.2 Moreover, the South Carolina court noted that if the sentencer
considered the victim's personal characteristics, the court would have to al-
low the defendant an opportunity to rebut the character information and,
therefore, focus the sentencing decision on the victim and not the defend-
ant.22 Thus, the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that the read-
ing of the prayer card and reference to the voter registration card during the
sentencing phase violated Gathers' eighth amendment rights, and may have
led the jury to impose the death sentence based on the victim's alleged reli-
gious character and the belief that the victim was a registered voter rather
than on Gathers' moral culpability. 3
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision.24 The Supreme
Court held that the information relating to the victim, the contents of the
cards, was inadmissible because the information could be "purely fortui-
tous,'"25 unrelated to the circumstances of the crime, and not "relevant to
the defendant's moral culpability."26 In particular, the Court held that the
prayer card and voter registration card were similar to victim impact state-
ments, which the Booth Court had previously declared inadmissible during
the sentencing phase of a trial.2"
Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that the eighth amendment does not
prohibit the jury from considering the victim's characteristics.28 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that prohibiting the jury from considering victim-related
information would prevent the jury from examining the harm caused by the
20. Id. at 484, 369 S.E.2d at 144.
21. Id. at 483-84, 369 S.E.2d at 144.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the convictions of murder and first
degree criminal sexual conduct, reversed the death sentence, and remanded for a new sentenc-
ing proceeding. Id. at 484, 369 S.E.2d at 144-45.
24. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989). A majority of five Justices af-
firmed the decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
dissented. Id. at 806.
25. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812.
26. Id. at 811-12.
27. Id. at 810-12. Although the Court stated that Ithe fact that Gathers scattered
Haynes' personal papers around his body while going through them looking for something to
steal was certainly a relevant circumstance of the crime," the Court concluded that the con-
tents of the two cards were not relevant because no evidence existed that Gathers had read the
cards. Id. at 811.
28. Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined Justice O'Connor's dissent. Id. at 812.
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defendant to the victim and the victim's family.29 Justice Scalia, in a sepa-
rate dissent, also argued that victim-related information should be consid-
ered and urged the Court to overturn Booth. Justice Scalia stated that
"wrongly decided" cases like Booth, which deal with "evolving standards of
decency" should be overturned before society revamps its laws to comply
with the erroneous decisions.3°
This Note surveys the standards defining the admissibility of information
in capital punishment proceedings. It then examines the prior history re-
garding the admissibility of victim impact statements during the sentencing
phase of death penalty proceedings. Next, this Note analyzes the United
States Supreme Court's decision in South Carolina v. Gathers in light of prior
Supreme Court precedent. The Note concludes that Gathers is simply one
step in the Supreme Court's continuing prohibition on the use of victim im-
pact statements and victim-related information in capital punishment pro-
ceedings. Further, while the Note recommends a method by which the
victim-related information might be considered, this Note asserts that the
Court's prohibition is likely to continue until there is a legislative mandate
or a change in the composition or posture of the Supreme Court.
I. THE STANDARDS DEFINING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INFORMATION IN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Whether information is admissible in a capital punishment proceeding de-
pends on numerous constitutional, legislative, and judicial constraints.
These controls are present to maintain fairness in capital punishment pro-
ceedings. The most important constraint in death penalty sentencing is the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. The legislature and
judiciary have also imposed restrictions in the capital sentencing arena.
A. The Constitutional Parameters to Capital Sentencing: The Eighth
Amendment
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Exces-
sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."'" The courts and commentators defining
the rather vague cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amend-
ment highlight the requirement that a sentence be fair and reasonable.32
29. Id. at 816-21.
30. Id. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Nevares-
Muniz, supra note 2, at 273-78.
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Moreover, the judiciary has recognized two approaches to interpreting the
cruel and unusual punishments clause.33
Under the first approach, the traditional interpretation, only punishments
of torture and unnecessary cruelty are prohibited by the eighth amend-
ment.34 The traditional interpretation is backward-looking because it at-
tempts to determine if a punishment is cruel and unusual by comparing the
particular punishment to punishments considered cruel and unusual at the
time the eighth amendment was adopted." The United States Supreme
Court, in Weems v. United States,36 acknowledged this approach while de-
termining the legality of a Philippine Penal Code provision under the Philip-
pine Bill of Rights.37 There, the Court stated that in Wilkerson v. Utah," an
earlier Court found death by firing squad acceptable under the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution because death was a typical
punishment for murder, Utah resorted to death by firing squad for many
years, and military law provided for death by firing squad. 39 Nevertheless,
in Weems, the Court rejected the traditional approach and stated that "[i]n
the application of a constitution ... our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be.'
The second approach, termed the "evolving standards of decency" inter-
pretation, was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1958 and is
more flexible than the traditional approach in satisfying the eighth amend-
ment.4" Since the Court recognized this interpretation, courts have used the
33. Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2, at 273-76; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 264-85 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman provides a concise interpreta-
tion of the eighth amendment. Justice Brennan stated that (1) a punishment could be
considered excessive if a less severe punishment is available which would serve the same pur-
pose, id. at 279; (2) severe punishment may not be imposed arbitrarily by a state, id. at 274; (3)
the court must be as objective as possible in rendering a decision, id. at 277; and (4) human
dignity may not be sacrificed by a punishment, id. at 270, 273.
34. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (death by firing squad held not cruel
and unusual under the eighth amendment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
(1947) (failure of electrocution to be successful on the first attempt was held not to be cruel
and unusual under the eighth amendment). Examples of unnecessary cruelty, according to the
Court, are disembowelling alive, beheading, burning alive, quartering, and crucifixion.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 264-65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
446 (1890); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135).
35. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910)).
36. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
37. Id. at 351.
38. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
39. Weems, 217 U.S. at 369-70.
40. Id. at 373.
41. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2, at 274 n.16. In
Weems, the Court first addressed the possibility that as time passed, the judiciary could inter-
[Vol. 40:215
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traditional approach less frequently.42 The evolving standards of decency
interpretation construes the eighth amendment by looking to "objective indi-
cia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."43 These objec-
tive indicia include statutorily and judicially imposed penalties and societal
values as defined by the public, the judiciary, history, and morals." The
evolving standards of decency interpretation of the eighth amendment, in
conjunction with the legislative and judicial sentencing goals of retribution,45
deterrence,1 6 incapacitation,47 and rehabilitation," encourages courts to as-
pret the eighth amendment differently. Weems. 217 U.S. at 373; Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2,
at 274.
42. Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2, at 274-75.
43. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976).
44. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288; Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2, at 275.
45. When determining appropriate sentences, courts do not rely on one particular sen-
tencing goal, but instead rely on a combination of sentencing goals. A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF
SENTENCING § 4, at 21 (1978). Congress designed the sentencing goals to "provide certainty
and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988). Retri-
bution, in general, is retaliation by society against the defendant for the harm caused by the
defendant to the victim and the victim's family. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1988); Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 212. There are basically two forms of retribution: "moral retribution"
and "social retribution." See Comment, supra note 10, at 212, 214. Under moral retribution,
the sentencer measures the goodness of society against the evil nature of the defendant. If the
sentencer finds that the defendant acted immorally, a punishment can be imposed. Id. at 212.
Under social retribution, the sentencer imposes a punishment based on the degree of harm
caused by the defendant to society, in general, and to the victim and the victim's family, in
particular. Id. at 214. Retribution was a sentencing goal under the Bible and the Hammurabi
Code. Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1940 (1988). In the 1950's, the judiciary and the commentators
favored rehabilitation and deterrence. Id. at 1940-41. Most recently, emphasis has shifted
back to favoring retribution and incapacitation. Id. at 1941; Sebba, The Victim's Role in the
Penal Process. A Theoretical Orientation, 30 AM. J. COMp. L. 217, 218 (1982).
46. The sentencing objective of deterrence is to prevent a potential criminal from commit-
ting a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1988); Comment, supra note 10, at 215. The
concept underlying deterrence is that a potential criminal will weigh the expected costs and
benefits of committing a certain crime and act only if the expected benefits outweigh the ex-
pected costs. See Comment, supra note 10, at 215. There are two types of deterrence: general
and specific. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 5, at 24. General deterrence deters the general
public from committing crimes. Specific deterrence deters a particular criminal from commit-
ting the same or another crime. Id.; see also H. GRoss, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUsTICE
394-400 (1979) (referring to general deterrence as the intimidation version and specific deter-
rence as the persuasion version).
The deterrence rationale, however, has certain weaknesses. Many criminals neither think
rationally nor weigh the expected costs and benefits of committing a certain crime. Therefore,
sentences based on deterrence fail to deter "irrational" criminals. A. CAMPBELL, supra note
45, § 5, at 26; Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1670, 1676-77 (1986). Another weakness of the deterrence rationale is the possible loss
of respect for the legal system by the public when the court imposes a sentence that is too
harsh on a criminal. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 5, at 26-27. Instead of deterring the
general public, the public sympathizes with the criminal. Id. § 5, at 27.
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sess the proportionality between the offense committed and the punishment
imposed on the accused, and to ensure a close nexus between the two.49
Accordingly, under the eighth amendment and the sentencing goals,
courts strive to ensure that sentences are proportional to the severity of the
defendant's crime. Courts achieve the necessary proportionality by making
individualized sentencing determinations that reduce the likelihood of im-
posing subjective and disproportional sentences. In the capital punishment
context, because of the irrevocable nature of death sentences, an even
stronger need exists for the sentencer to make individualized sentencing de-
terminations for each defendant.
B. Sentencing in Capital Cases: The Need for an Individualized
Sentencing Determination
As the sentencer in capital punishment proceedings, the judge or jury con-
siders all of the relevant information to determine the propriety of imposing
47. As a sentencing goal, incapacitation is designed to remove criminals from society to
eliminate possible commission of future crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (1988); Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 216. Forms of incapacitation range from probation to the death pen-
alty. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 6, at 28. The success of incapacitation depends entirely
upon the ability of the criminal justice system to identify and incapacitate criminals who have
a disposition to commit crimes. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 6, at 29-30; H. GROSS, supra
note 46, at 385-86. Herein lies a problem with incapacitation. The criminal justice system
confines some convicted criminals to prisons which may make criminals even more dangerous
upon their release. H. GROSS, supra note 46, at 386-87. In addition, not only is identifying
criminals with dispositions to commit crimes difficult, but the criminal justice system is
designed to determine guilt or innocence and not criminal disposition. Id. at 387. Neverthe-
less, by identifying and incapacitating those criminals with dispositions to commit crimes, the
criminal justice system protects society only from those criminals who are a danger to society.
A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 6, at 30; H. GROSS, supra note 46, at 386. These criminals
who do not pose a threat to society are punished as well, but not by incapacitation. A segment
of the population, however, believes all criminals should be imprisoned. A. CAMPBELL, supra
note 45, § 6, at 30.
48. Rehabilitation focuses on reforming offenders and altering their criminal tendencies
through individualized programs. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (1988); A. CAMPBELL, supra
note 45, § 8, at 34; Comment, supra note 10, at 217-18. Under rehabilitation, crime is consid-
ered a disease which has distorted a person's disposition. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 8, at
34. Rehabilitation cures this disease through job training, psychiatric therapy, or other types
of treatment. Id. § 8, at 34-35. There is a conflict among commentators and the courts over
whether rehabilitation is effective. Some lawmakers and commentators believe that incarcera-
tion will not rehabilitate criminals, and instead, the lawmakers and commentators advocate
education and medical treatment to help criminals reform. Comment, supra note 10, at 217-
18. Others believe that rehabilitation fails because few criminals take advantage of the rehabil-
itative programs. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 8, at 40. Because rehabilitation focuses on
the criminal and his disease, rather than on the crime committed, some commentators believe
rehabilitation is tailored more to the individual criminal than the other sentencing goals. Id. at
§ 8, at 34-35.
49. Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2, at 274-75.
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a death sentence. The sentencer, however, is not without guidance. In fact,
the Supreme Court requires that "'clear and objective standards' "" guide
the sentencer5" to avoid an arbitrarily and capriciously imposed death sen-
tence. 5 2 Moreover, the Court requires that the sentencer find a "nexus be-
tween the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness,, 5 3 and
consider all mitigating circumstances.'
Specifically, the Supreme Court has required that, because the death sen-
tence is a profoundly different penalty and is so "unique in its severity and
irrevocability," 5 a sentencer must reach an individualized sentence and
must be able to evaluate mitigating circumstances such as the defendant's
background and the details of the crime committed. 56 In Lockett v. Ohio, 57
the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio's imposition of the death
penalty on the grounds that Ohio's death penalty statute violated the eighth
and fourteenth amendments by limiting the relevant mitigating factors that
the sentencer could consider.5" According to the Court, to reach an individ-
ualized sentencing determination, the sentencer must be able to consider
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death."59 Ideally, this additional evaluation of circumstances during
the sentencing process leads to a determination of whether the death sen-
tence is appropriate in individual cases."o In particular, this individualized
sentencing determination attempts to decrease the possibility that a sen-
tencer will impose the death penalty on a first time offender as readily as on
a multiple offender.6
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834,
204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
51. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
52. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
53. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
55. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
56. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
57. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
58. Id. at 608.
59. Id. at 604.
60. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112; Lockett,
438 U.S. at 604-05.
61. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949); see also Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (sustaining the use of a probation officer's report to individualize
death sentence determinations).
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The Court also requires that the information which the sentencer evalu-
ates relate to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt."6 2
This requirement attempts to ensure that a sentencer will only consider in-
formation relating to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime,
and will ignore irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial information. Therefore, by
limiting the information that the sentencer considers, the sentencer will
more likely impose a sentence proportional to the crime committed, as man-
dated by the eighth amendment.63 In addition, the information that the sen-
tencer considers must not be "constitutionally impermissible or totally
irrelevant to the sentencing process." 64 In McCleskey v. Kemp, 65 the defend-
ant appealed his death sentence, contending that the jury imposed the death
sentence because of his race.66 Although the Court held that the defendant
failed to prove that the sentence was racially based, the Court intimated that
a sentence based on such information would be unconstitutional.67 In an
earlier case, the Court stated that "the race, religion, or political affiliation of
the defendant" were constitutionally unacceptable factors for the jury to
consider when imposing the death sentence.68
Finally, according to the Court, the jury speaks for the community69 and
acts as a liaison between the community and the criminal justice system in
capital cases.7 ° The Court prescribed this role for the jury because of the
jury's perceived ability to act as a "significant and reliable objective index of
contemporary values."'" To act effectively as a liaison between the commu-
nity and the penal system, the jury must assess the effect of the crime on the
victim, the victim's family, and society.72 Victim impact statements are one
62. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). "American criminal law has long con-
sidered a defendant's intention-and therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree of
[his] criminal culpability.'" Id. at 800 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975)); see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156-58 (1987).
63. See, e.g., Tison, 481 U.S. at 149-50, 152 n.4, 156 (to assume proportionality, the prose-
cution must show some intent or attempt to kill, at the least, before the death sentence is
imposed). "In Enmund v. Florida, the Court recognized again the importance of mental state,
explicitly permitting the death penalty in at least those cases where the felony murderer in-
tended to kill and forbidding it in the case of a minor actor not shown to have had any culpable
mental state." Id. at 156.
64. Zant, 462 U.S. at 885.
65. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 291-99.
68. Zant, 462 U.S. at 885.
69. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
70. Id. at 519 n.15.
71. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
(1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).
72. Comment, supra note 10, at 203-04, 207, 219.
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source of victim information that courts use to assist the sentencer in consid-
ering the effects of the crime.73
II. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT
Victim impact statements serve as only one method of increasing the in-
volvement of victims in the sentencing process.74 In capital punishment pro-
ceedings, a victim impact statement usually constitutes a part of the
presentence report and contains information regarding the personal charac-
teristics of the victim of the crime." The statement may include any one or
more of the following types of information: the details of the crime, a de-
scription of the victim, the effects of the crime on the victim and on the
victim's family, and opinions of the victim or the victim's family regarding
the defendant and the appropriate sentence.76 Although states widely accept
victim impact statements as sentencing tools in non-capital sentencing pro-
ceedings, 77 some state courts question the statements' role in capital punish-
ment proceedings.78
In 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act (Act).79
The purpose of the Act was to bolster the protection and the involvement of
victims and witness in the criminal justice system and "to provide a model
73. Id. at 202-03.
74. See id. at 200. Other methods include informing the victim of a convicted defendant's
judicial proceedings and requiring the convicted defendant to pay restitution to the victim or
the victim's family. Id. (citing Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
291, §§ 5(a), 6(a)(4), 96 Stat. 1248, 1253-56 (1982); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663-64 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988)).
75. Victim impact statements include "information concerning any harm, including finan-
cial, social, psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the
offense ... and any other information that may aid the court in sentencing, including the
restitution needs of any victim of the offense." Victim & Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-291, § 3, 96 Stat. 1248, 1249.
76. Id.
77. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted legislation dealing with
victim impact statements. See supra note 10.
78. See People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516-17, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287-88 (1984)
(holding that the victim's family's sorrow has no place in the sentencing decision of a criminal
case); People v. Raminez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 454, 457 N.E.2d 31, 38 (1983) (victim's widow's
testimony at sentencing phase of capital punishment proceedings lacked any probative value
and was therefore inadmissible), af'd, 114 Ill. 2d 125, 500 N.E.2d 14 (1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1053 (1987). But see Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 23, (Alaska 1977) (the victim's back-
ground is relevant in a negligent vehicular homicide case even if the defendant did not know or
select the victim); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 751, 490 A.2d 1228, 1259 (1985) (victim
impact information is not prohibited by the Constitution and may be relevant during the sen-
tencing phase), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
79. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248.
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for legislation for State and local governments."80 Congress enacted the Act
in response to growing public concern that while defendants have a right to
counsel, victims and witnesses have no such right."' According to the Act,
victims suffer mental, financial, and physical hardship, are often left in the
dark regarding the status of the proceedings, and are "used as tools."8 2 The
Act requires that presentence reports include victim impact statements, pro-
tects victims and witnesses from intimidation, provides a mechanism for
courts to order restitution, orders the United States Department of Justice to
establish guidelines consistent with the Act, and restricts the opportunities
for a federal felon to profit from his or her crime.83 Although state legisla-
tures and Congress have passed substantial legislation regarding the use of
victim impact statements, 4 the United States Supreme Court did not con-
sider the use of such statements in capital punishment proceedings until
Booth v. Maryland.8 "
III. BooTH V. MARYLAND: ADDRESSING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
PROCEEDINGS
In Booth v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Maryland law requiring incorporation of victim impact
statements in presentence reports for capital cases.8 6 The Maryland Circuit
Court of Baltimore City convicted the defendant of murdering an elderly
couple.7 During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor read a
victim impact statement to the jury.8 The statement, prepared by the
Maryland Division of Parole and Probation and the victims' family, de-
scribed the victims as "amazing people" who were "butchered like ani-
80. Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 2(b), 96 Stat. at 1249.
81. Id. at § 2(a), 96 Stat. at 1248.
82. Id.
83. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 14, 30, 37, 42, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2515, 2517, 2520, 2536, 2543, 2548. The Act amended portions of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, title 18 of the United States Code, and the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Id. at 9, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2515.
84. See supra note 10.
85. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
86. Id. at 509.
87. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 181-82, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103 (1986), vacated in part, 482
U.S. 496 (1987), vacated en banc, 316 Md. 363, 558 A.2d 1205 (1989). The jury convicted
Booth of first degree murder of Mr. Bronstein, both premeditated and felony murder, and
acting as a first degree principal in that murder and imposed the death sentence. The jury also
imposed a life sentence on Booth for first degree murder of Mrs. Bronstein, and three consecu-
tive twenty year sentences for robbery and conspiracy. Id. at 182, 507 A.2d at 1103.
88. Booth, 482 U.S. at 500-01.
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mals."' 9 In addition, the statement indicated that the victims' family did
not believe that the defendant could be rehabilitated.' Booth appealed the
decision, contending, inter alia, that the introduction of the victim impact
statement violated his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.9 The
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, and held
that the victim impact statement was "straightforward and factual" and that
the death sentence was not imposed arbitrarily.92
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals' decision and held that the admission of a victim impact statement
during the sentencing phase of the trial violated the defendant's eighth
amendment rights. 93 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, began the
Court's analysis by focusing on the need to limit the information introduced
at sentencing to information related to the defendant's "'personal responsi-
bility and moral guilt.' ,9 The Court noted that victim impact statements
typically focus on the victim,95 not the defendant, and may relate to circum-
stances irrelevant to the crime.96 Moreover, the Court indicated that such
statements may even describe circumstances over which the defendant had
no control, such as the effect of the crime on the victim's family.97 The
Court asserted that only on rare occasions do defendants commit crimes
based upon the effect of the crime on people other than the victim.9" The
Court stated, however, that when the crime is committed with knowledge of
89. Id. at 510, 512. The complete victim impact statement is attached to the Court's
opinion as an appendix. Id. at 509-15. The victim impact statement discusses, among other
things, the effects of the murders upon the upcoming wedding in the family and upon the daily
routine of the victims' family, and the viciousness of the murders. Id.; see infra notes 90, 101.
90. Booth, 482 U.S. at 513. The victims' daughter "doesn't feel that the people who did
this could ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't want them to be able to do this again or put
another family through this. She feels that the lives of her family members will never be the
same again." Id.
91. Booth, 306 Md. at 222, 507 A.2d at 1124.
92. Id. at 223, 507 A.2d at 1124.
93. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
94. Id. at 502 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)); see supra notes 50-
68 and accompanying text. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice
Powell's opinion. Id. at 497.
95. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503, 504.
96. Id. at 504.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 504 n.7. The Court quoted People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516-17, 203
Cal. Rptr. 276, 287-88 (1984), regarding the proposition that the harm caused to a victim's
family is related to damages in a civil action and not sentencing in criminal action. Booth, 482
U.S. at 504-05 & n.7.
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the consequences, that information is relevant because it relates to the de-
fendant's state of mind at the time of the crime.99
The majority also found that the composition of victim impact statements
create the risk that the sentencer might arbitrarily impose the death sen-
tence. "o In Booth, the family was articulate and able to express its grief.o'
The Court also noted, however, that there would be cases in which the vic-
tim did not leave a family behind, or the family was less able to articulate its
grief."0 2 In these situations, the Court asserted that victim impact state-
ments might reflect an absence or decreased level of grief when, in reality,
the suffering was equal to or greater than the suffering of a family which was
more articulate. 0 3 Therefore, the Court stated that a jury could indirectly
base its determination of whether to impose the death sentence on a victim
impact statement that reflected a family's ability to articulate its thoughts
and feelings of suffering, rather than on a defendant's background and rec-
ord and the circumstances of the case.'1 4
Furthermore, the Court noted that if the prosecution introduces evidence
relating to the victim's personality and characteristics, then courts must al-
low the defendant the chance to rebut that evidence." The Court, relying
on its own precedent, '° stated that due process requires the Court to allow
99. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987)). But see
Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the
Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1503 (1974) (arguming that criminal law pun-
ishes according to actual results of conduct and not according to moral guilt).
100. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
101. Id. For example, the impact statement reported that the victims' daughter
still cries every day. She states that she doesn't sleep through a single night and
thinks a part of her died too when her parents were killed. She reports that she
doesn't find much joy in anything and her powers of concentration aren't good. She
feels as if her brain is on overload. The victims' daughter relates that she had to
clean out her parents' house and it took several weeks. She saw the bloody carpet,
knowing that her parents had been there, and she felt like getting down on the rug
and holding her mother.
Id. at 512.
102. Id. at 505.
103. Id.
104. Id. In Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), vacated in part, 482 U.S.
496 (1987), vacated en banc, 316 Md. 363, 558 A.2d 1205 (1989), Judge Cole, in a separate
opinion, raised the issue of the opinion of the victims' family. He stated that victim impact
statements in capital punishment proceedings create the subjectivity and uncertainty that the
Supreme Court had previously denounced. Id. at 233, 507 A.2d at 1129 (Cole, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 764 n.6, 490 A.2d
1228, 1265 n.6 (1985) (Cole, J., concurring) (victim impact information is not prohibited by
the Constitution and may be relevant during the sentencing phase), vacated on other grounds,
475 U.S. 1078 (1986); see Comment, supra note 10, at 214 n.67.
105. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
106. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
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the defendant the opportunity to rebut presentence reports. 10 7 According to
the Court, a rebuttal phase could sidetrack the jury and result in a "mini-
trial" on the victim's personality, instead of enabling the jury to decide
whether to impose the death sentence based on the defendant's crime.'08
In addition, the majority stated that the introduction of the victim impact
statement clouds an observer's ability to determine the grounds upon which
the court imposed a death sentence.°9 The Court indicated that the intro-
duction of victim impact statements allows the jury to consider emotional
factors such as the grief and anger felt by the victim's family. ," According
to the Court, however, the sentencer must impose the death penalty based on
reason and not on caprice or emotion. "' Therefore, the Court stated that by
allowing the jury to consider emotional factors, courts obscure the standards
upon which the jury relies in imposing the death sentence and increase the
possibility that the jury will impose the death sentence based upon caprice
and emotion. 12
Justice White, dissenting in Booth, "i' focused first on the fact that sentenc-
ing procedures are peculiarly questions of legislative policy." 4 As Justice
White noted, the majority in Booth should have respected the Maryland leg-
islature's decision that the degree of harm caused by the defendant and the
victims' family's statement were relevant sentencing considerations."'I
Based on this assertion, Justice White claimed that the Court should have
refrained from taking action against the admissibility of the victim impact
statement. 116
In the alternative, Justice White stated that, regardless of whether the rel-
evance of the harm caused by the defendant is a legislative question, a jury's
consideration of the harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime is
proper. 17 Justice White posited that courts often consider the harm caused
107. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07.
108. Id. at 507.
109. Id. at 506 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)).
110. Id. at 506-07; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29, 433.
111. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
112. Id. at 506, 508.
113. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined Justice White's dis-
sent. Id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). The dissent quoted
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972), that legisla-
tures, and not the courts, are designed to respond to the will and moral values of the people.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 515. Justice White also stated that there was nothing " 'cruel or unusual' or
otherwise unconstitutional about the legislature's decision to use victim impact statements in
capital sentencing hearings." Id at 515-16.
115. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515.
116. Id. at 515-16.
117. Id. at 516.
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by the defendant as a relevant factor during the sentencing phase."" The
Justice indicated that the identity of the victim is relevant in sentencing deci-
sions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1111, and 1751, which authorize the death
sentence for anyone who assassinates the head of a governmental agency, a
Member of Congress, a Supreme Court Justice, a Cabinet Official, a Con-
gressman, and the Vice President or President of the United States. ,"9 Jus-
tice White concluded that these statutes reflect Congress' recognition that
the harm caused by the defendant in committing certain crimes may dictate
whether the defendant receives the death sentence.' 20
According to Justice White, other reasons also exist supporting jury con-
sideration of victim impact statements in capital cases. One reason Justice
White raised is the states' valid interest in rebutting mitigating evidence sub-
mitted by the defendant. 2 1 Justice White noted that each state's interest in
capital punishment proceedings is particularly strong because the victim is
an individual who also has rights, and society may suffer a loss because of
the victim's death. 122 The victim impact statement, Justice White claimed,
provides useful information regarding aggravating circumstances needed to
counter the mitigating circumstances in favor of the defendant. '2 3 Further-
more, Justice White dismissed the majority's concerns over the prospect of a
"mini-trial" on the victim's personality, resulting from the submission of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances, 24 as purely speculative because no
such "mini-trial" occurred at the trial court.'
25
Finally, Justice White denounced the majority's declaration that all victim
impact statements admitted during the sentencing phase were unconstitu-
tional per se. 126 Justice White indicated that, while the victim impact state-
ment in Booth stated that the victims' family did not believe the defendant
could be rehabilitated, not all victim impact statements contain such prejudi-
cial opinions. '2 7 Therefore, Justice White contended that the admissibility
of victim impact statements should turn upon the content and the degree of
prejudice elicited by the statements rather than their status as victim impact
statements. 128
118. Id.
119. Id. at 516-17 nn.1 & 2.
120. Id. at 516-17.
121. Id. at 517.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
125. Booth, 482 U.S. at 518.
126. Id. at 518-19.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Also dissenting, Justice Scalia 29 focused on the degree of harm caused by
the defendant and the relationship of the harm caused by the defendant to
the "personal responsibility and moral guilt' 30 of the defendant. Justice
Scalia disputed the majority's claim that all death sentences are imposed
based on moral guilt.' 3 ' Rather, the Justice stated that such sentences are
imposed based on personal responsibility. 32 According to Justice Scalia,
personal responsibility is directly proportional to the amount of harm
caused.' 3 3 Therefore, Justice Scali'a argued that the Court should consider
the harm caused by the defendant in Booth, namely, the effect of the murders
on the victims' family.
Justice Scalia also asserted that the present capital punishment procedure
is unfair in its focus on protecting the defendant without allowing the victim
or the victim's family to express the nature and degree of harm caused by the
defendant.' 34 Thus, Justice Scalia called for greater consideration of "vic-
tims' rights"'13  to counter the defendant-oriented nature of capital punish-
ment proceedings.
136
IV. THE STATUS OF VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AFTER BOOTH
Lower courts have interpreted the Booth v. Maryland decision regarding
the admissibility in sentencing decisions of information relating to the victim
in various ways. 137 In People v. Ghent, ,3 the defendant was sentenced to
129. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined Justice Scalia's dis-
sent. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)); see supra notes 62-68 and
accompanying text.
131. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519.
132. Id. at 519-20.
133. Id.: see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152, 157-58 (1987) (the death sentence is
appropriate for major participation in felony murder because of personal responsibility for
harm caused); see infra notes 194-95, 201-04, 245-50 and accompanying text.
134. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519-20.
135. Id. at 520. Justice Scalia stated, "Recent years have seen an outpouring of popular
concern for... 'victims' rights'-a phrase that describes what its proponents feel is the failure
of courts of justice to take into account... the amount of harm [the defendant] has caused to
innocent members of society." Id.; see also O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court:
Victims' Rights and a New Model of Criminal Review, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363
(1984) (examining the effects of expanded roles for "victims' rights" organizations on the crim-
inal justice system). O'Neill states that victims' rights movements have multiplied in the past
years with organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, Crime Victims Legal Advo-
cacy Institute, and the Guardian Angels. This movement has pushed state and federal govern-
ments to adopt programs creating more opportunities for victims to participate in criminal
prosecutions. Id. at 369-71.
136. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520-21.
137. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,813 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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death for first degree murder and other related crimes. 39 The defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court of California contending, inter alia, that the
prosecutor, during the sentencing phase, acted improperly in referring to the
impact of the victim's death upon the victim's family."4 According to the
court, "the prosecutor . . . merely observed that [the victim's] death will
'leave something precious missing from her family and her friends, her hus-
band, for [sic] everyone. It's something that can never be replaced for a
moment's pleasure on [the defendant's] part.' "141 The court asserted that
the comments were "brief and mild" and differed from the "lengthy and
specific details regarding the actual impact on the victim's family" that were
present in Booth. 142 The court, affirming the conviction, concluded that the
prejudicial effect of the comments was "minimal or nonexistent." '143
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Jones, '" affirmed the
death sentence of a defendant convicted of murder, attempted murder,
armed robbery, and other related crimes.' 45 The defendant appealed the
conviction by the circuit court on several grounds, including the contention
that the trial judge improperly considered victim impact information when
imposing the sentence. 46 The court distinguished the victim impact state-
ment in Booth from the information the trial judge considered in Jones, 147
and stated that the Court in Booth realized that information such as the
injuries to the victim's husband, which "related 'directly to the circum-
138. 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929
(1988); see also People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1089-90, 755 P.2d 960, 993-94, 248 Cal. Rptr.
510, 543-44 (1988) (prosecutor's statements made during closing arguments did not constitute
reversible error under Booth because no evidence was introduced regarding the impact of the
victim's death), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1051 (1989); Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind.
1988) (prosecutor's statements during closing argument in the sentencing phase did not violate
Booth because the prosecutor only commented on evidence concerning the victim's family rela-
tionship which had been introduced during the guilt phase of the trial), vacated 109 S. Ct.
3182 (1989), af'd on remand, 561 N.E.2d 487 (1990) (acknowledging that prosecutor's state-
ments present a potential issue under Gathers, but refusing to apply Booth and Gathers retroac-
tively because of Indiana's statutory capital sentencing scheme).
139. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 748, 739 P.2d at 1255, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
140. Id. at 771-72, 739 P.2d at 1271-72, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
141. Id. at 772, 739 P.2d at 1271, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
142. Id. (emphasis in original).
143. Id. at 772, 780, 739 P.2d at 1271, 1277, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04, 109.
144. 123 Ill. 2d 387, 528 N.E.2d 648 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989).
145. Id. at,393, 428, 528 N.E.2d at 651, 667.
146. Id. at 423, 528 N.E.2d at 665.
147. Id. at 424-26, 528 N.E.2d at 665-66. In Jones, the victim impact statement was a
brief, one page account describing the victim's husband's physical injuries, psychological treat-
ments, medical expenses, and living arrangements, as well as a statement by the husband on
the loss of his wife. Id. at 425, 528 N.E.2d at 665.
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stances of the crime,'" might be admissible at the sentencing phase.'4 8 In
affirming the death sentence, the court concluded that the trial judge's con-
sideration of the victim impact statement was not in violation of Booth or the
defendant's eighth amendment rights. 149
Not all courts, however, have read Booth so narrowly. In State v. Gath-
ers, 50 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the death sentence of a
defendant convicted of murder and first degree criminal sexual conduct.' '
One of the grounds on which the defendant appealed the lower court's con-
viction was that the prosecution, during the sentencing phase, violated the
defendant's eighth amendment rights by reciting at length the contents of a
prayer card and referring to a voter registration card found on the victim's
body."'52 Although the prayer and voter registration cards were not the same
as victim impact statements, the defendant argued that the victim-related
information was similar to the victim impact statements rejected in Booth. '5'
To resolve the confusion in the lower courts over the admissibility of victim-
related information, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
South Carolina v. Gathers. "'
V. SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS." THE APPLICATION OF BOOTH v
MARYLAND TO VICTIM-RELATED INFORMATION IN CAPITAL
CASES
In South Carolina v. Gathers, "' the Supreme Court addressed the admis-
sibility of victim-related information in light of the Court's precedent regard-
ing victim impact statements. In Gathers, Richard Haynes, a self-
proclaimed minister with a prior history of mental problems was attacked in
a park by Demetrius Gathers and three of Gathers' friends.' 56 Gathers and
his friends assaulted Haynes after Haynes refused to speak to Gathers.
57
Gathers and one of his friends then searched Haynes' belongings to steal
something."' Haynes had several bags of religious items with him which
148. Id. at 425, 528 N.E.2d at 666 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.10
(1987)).
149. Id. at 425-26, 528 N.E.2d at 666.
150. 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140 (1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
151. Id. at 478, 369 S.E.2d at 141.
152. Id. at 482, 369 S.E.2d at 143-44.
153. Id. at 482-84, 369 S.E.2d at 144.
154. 488 U.S. 888 (1988).
155. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
156. Id. at 806-07 (majority opinion); id. at 814-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 807 (majority opinion); id. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the attackers scattered on the ground during the attack.'5 9 After knocking
Haynes unconscious, Gathers' friends left, but Gathers stayed and continued
to assault Haynes. Later, Gathers returned with a friend and stabbed
Haynes to death.'6°
At the trial before the General Session Court of Charleston County, South
Carolina, witnesses testified that Haynes was a religious person, carried vari-
ous religious items with him, and frequently spoke with people about reli-
gion. 16 ' All of the religious items on Haynes at the time of the attack were
introduced into evidence without objection at both the guilt and sentencing
phases of the trial. 1 62 The jury returned a verdict of guilty for the murder
and sexual assault of Haynes.' 63 In his closing argument during the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial, the prosecutor read the contents of one of the prayer
cards on Haynes' body at the time of the murder and referred to Haynes'
voter registration card. ' 64 The prayer card, entitled the "Game Guy's
Prayer,"' 65 equated life with a sports game and asked God to grant the
"player" the strength to handle adversities. 166 The prosecutor then used the
information to portray the victim as a religious, civic minded citizen.' 67
Based on the evidence introduced at sentencing, the jury recommended the
death sentence for Gathers. 168
Gathers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 169
He contended that the prosecution's reading of the contents of the prayer
card and the references to the voter registration card during the sentencing
decision of his trial violated his eighth amendment rights as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court in Booth. 170 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina found that the prosecutor's closing argument at the sentencing
phase violated Gathers' eighth amendment rights. 171 Specifically, the court
concluded that the reading of the prayer card and referencing the voter re-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 478, 369 S.E.2d
140, 141 (1988).
164. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 808-10.
165. Id. at 808; State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. at 482-83, 369 S.E.2d at 143-44.
166. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 809; State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. at 482-83, 369
S.E.2d at 143-44.
167. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 808-10.
168. Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. at 478, 369 S.E.2d at
141.
169. State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. at 476, 369 S.E.2d at 141.
170. Id. at 482-84, 369 S.E.2d at 143-44.
171. Id.
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gistration card focused the sentencer on the personal characteristics of the
victim, when the focus of the sentencing should have been on Gathers. 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
victim-related information, as opposed to victim impact statements, was ad-
missible during the sentencing phase of Gathers' trial.'73
A. The Court's Opinion: Restricting the Admissibility of Victim-related
Information
In Gathers, the prosecution argued that the contents of the prayer card
and the voter registration card were admissible because they " 'relate[d] di-
rectly to the circumstances of the crime.' ,174 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. In a
concise opinion, 175 the majority held that the contents of the prayer card
and voter registration card were inadmissible in the sentencing proceed-
ing. 1 6 The Court noted that its decision in Booth left open the issue of
whether victim impact statements and victim-related information are admis-
sible if they " 'relate[d] directly to the circumstances of the crime.' ,1'7
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that while the cards may be relevant, the
contents of the cards could not have been "relevant to the 'circumstances of
the crime' " because the defendant did not read the cards.1
7 8
The majority began its analysis by asserting that, during the sentencing
phase of the capital punishment proceeding, the jury must focus only on
evidence and information "related to the moral culpability of the defend-
ant." 79 In addition, the Court stated that capital sentences must be im-
posed in a manner proportional to the "defendant's blameworthiness." "80
The Gathers Court determined that the prayer card and the voter registra-
tion card were relevant to the circumstances of the crime.' The Court
went on, however, to state that the contents of the cards did not directly
172. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing State v.
Gathers, 295 S.C. at 482, 369 S.E.2d at 143).
173. Id. at 810-12.
174. Id. at 811 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.10 (1987)).
175. Aside from the facts that the Court discusses, the majority opinion's actual analysis is
less than 3 pages in the United States Reports. Id. at 810-12.
176. Id. at 812. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's
opinion. Id. at 805.
177. Id. at 811 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.10 (1987)).
178. Id. at 811.
179. Id. at 810.
180. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting));
see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987).
181. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
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relate to the crime itself because the defendant had not read the cards.'" 2
The Court supported its assertion on the basis that the defendant probably
lacked knowledge of the contents of the cards at the time of the crime.'I 3
Because the crime occurred at night, and the defendant only sifted through
Haynes' belongings,'" 4 the Court determined that it was improbable that
Gathers saw the contents of the cards.'8 5 The Court concluded that the
contents of the prayer and registration cards and the inferences about the
victim that the prosecution drew from the cards were not relevant to the
commission of the crime and, therefore, not admissible during the sentencing
phase. 186
The Court also found the contents of the cards irrelevant because they
failed to provide any probative information regarding the moral culpability
of the defendant. 8 7 The majority claimed that allowing the jury to consider
this information "'could result in [the jury] imposing the death sentence
because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were
irrelevant to the decision to kill.' "18 Accordingly, because the reading of
the contents of the cards was sufficiently similar to a description of the vic-
tim's personal characteristics-one of the types of victim impact statements
declared inadmissible in Booth-the Court held the contents of the cards
inadmissible.' 89
B. Justice O'Connor's Dissent: The Eighth Amendment Requires
Consideration of Victim-Related Information
Justice O'Connor, writing one of the two dissents issued in Gathers, noted
the confusion in the lower courts regarding the proper interpretation of
Booth, and her willingness to overturn Booth. '9 Justice O'Connor also ar-
gued, however, that the Court did not have to overturn Booth to allow the
sentencer to consider the information in Gathers because the information in
question in Booth and Gathers was different in nature. 9 ' According to Jus-
tice O'Connor, the information in Gathers consisted of statements made by
182. Id.
183. Id. at 811-12.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 812.
188. Id. at 811 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)).
189. Id. at 810-12.
190. Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion. Id. at 812. Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent-
ing opinion. Id. at 823 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 813-14.
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the prosecution about the victim at the sentencing phase, while the informa-
tion in Booth consisted of statements made by the victim's family about the
harm caused to them. 192 Therefore, Justice O'Connor advocated a narrow
interpretation of both the eighth amendment and Booth with regard to the
admissibility of victim-related information, and thus would have allowed the
sentencer to consider the victim-related information during the sentencing
phase. 1
93
Justice O'Connor favored a narrow interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment because " 'the penalty imposed in a capital case [must] be proportional
to the harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness.' ,194 Justice
O'Connor implied that a narrow interpretation of the eighth amendment
comported with the proportionality requirement under the retribution ra-
tionale of sentencing because both the harm caused by the defendant to the
victim and the victim's family, and the defendant's blameworthiness were
relevant to the sentencing decision.'"
Justice O'Connor then criticized the present sentencing system as being
one-sided because the sentencer routinely considers information unrelated to
the crime when analyzing a defendant's background for mitigating circum-
stances, yet is prevented from considering similar information regarding the
victim's background. 96 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that, in accord
with the eighth and fourteenth amendments, the sentencer must take into
account " 'as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record . . . that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death' ""' because the sentencer's decision is so "profoundly moral" and
reflective of the "moral judgment of the community regarding the proper
penalty to be inflicted."'198 According to the Justice, however, some of the
192. Id. at 814.
193. Id. In addressing the impact of Booth on the scope of the eighth amendment, Justice
O'Connor noted that under a broad interpretation of the eighth amendment, almost all infor-
mation relating to the victim would be inadmissible during the sentencing phase. Id. In con-
trast, Justice O'Connor asserted that under a narrow interpretation of the eighth amendment,
information relating to the victim would be admissible during the sentencing phase. Id.; see
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 398 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I do not interpret
Booth as foreclosing the introduction of all evidence, in whatever form, about a murder
victim.").
194. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor. J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 823 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 817-18: see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (eighth amendment
requires the court to consider the characteristics and record of the defendant as well as the
circumstances of the crime in capital punishment proceedings).
197. Gathers, 490 U.S. at817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604)
(emphasis omitted).
198. Id. at 817.
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information proffered by defendants is extraneous to the crimes committed
by the defendants.' 9 9 Therefore, Justice O'Connor asserted that, because the
sentencing decision is so moral and the sentencer considers all mitigating
circumstances in favor of the defendant, the sentencer should also consider
information proffered by the victim or the victim's family as a basis for a
stronger punishment regardless of whether the information is directly rele-
vant to the circumstances of the crime.2 °°
Justice O'Connor also argued that the sentencer should consider the harm
caused by the defendant to the victim and the victim's family because society
has long relied on the notion of retribution in reaching a just punishment.2 '
The Justice relied on Supreme Court precedent to state that the harm caused
by the defendant in Gathers was a component properly used to determine the
defendant's culpability.2 °2 Further, Justice O'Connor argued that, gener-
ally, the appropriateness of the imposition of the death sentence increases
with the amount of harm done to the victim and the victim's family. 20 3
Therefore, Justice O'Connor stated that, because the jury renders a "moral
judgment" for society when sentencing a defendant, the harm caused by the
defendant is a normal and relevant factor for the jury to consider in deter-
mining the appropriate sentence despite the possibility that the jury may
become inflamed. 2 4
Justice O'Connor went on to refute Gathers' claim that the prosecutor's
reading of the contents of the cards at the sentencing phase may have enticed
the jury to impose the death sentence on impermissible grounds, such as the
199. Id.
200. Id. at 817-18, 820-21.
201. Id. at 818; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (capital punishment
serves both the retribution and deterrence goals of sentencing); Ogletree, supra note 45, at
1940-41 (discussing the role of retribution versus rehabilitation in federal sentencing guide-
lines); Schulhofer, supra note 99, at 1514-17 (discussing the role of retribution in sentencing);
Comment, supra note 10, at 212-14 (discussing moral and social retribution); Note, supra note
8, at 309-11 (harm caused by defendant is a factor in determining restitution); Note, Victim
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1984)
(criminal law considers societal and individual harm to fulfill the sentencing goals of retribu-
tion and restitution).
202. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1986), the Court held that the sentencer may impose the death penalty based upon a
"reckless indifference to the value of human life" which later results in death to the victim. Id.
at 157. In addition, the defendants "subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to
result in the taking of innocent life." Id. at 152. But, the sentencer can only impose the death
sentence where the "reckless indifference" later led to a loss of life, or a great amount of harm
caused. In this case, the harm caused by the defendant was great because the victims were
murdered. Therefore, the Court held that the death sentence may be appropriate. Id. at 157-
58.
203. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 819-20.
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victim's religion, race, or political affiliation.2"5 Justice O'Connor first stated
that a search of the record was necessary for "any allegedly erroneous or
improper remarks [that] so infected the entire proceedings with unfairness as
to render the resulting sentence a denial of due process. '""°6 Then, Justice
O'Connor noted that the prayer card and the voter registration card were
already in evidence without objection, and that the jury would be able to
read the prayer card anyway.2 °" Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the reading of the cards constituted harmless error, and thus, a remand
to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was the best alternative for deter-
mining whether the jury relied on impermissible grounds in the sentencing
decision. 0°
In concluding her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that there is nothing in
the eighth amendment requiring the victim to be a "faceless stranger," nor
forbidding the sentencer from considering the harm caused by the defendant
to the victim and the victim's family in capital cases. 2" Noting that the
eighth amendment prevents the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment,
Justice O'Connor contended that the introduction of the contents of the
prayer card and voter registration card did not cause the jury to render such
a sentence.210
C. Justice Scalia's Dissent: Harm Caused by the Defendant is a Relevant
Jury Consideration
Justice Scalia, writing a separate dissent, 21' began by stating that Booth
was wrongly decided, and that the Supreme Court should overrule that deci-
sion.212 Justice Scalia urged the Court to overrule Booth because he could
not see a recognizable distinction, for eighth amendment purposes, between
information relating to the harm to the victim and the victim's family, and
information relating to the personal characteristics of the victim. 2 3 There-
fore, Justice Scalia argued that courts should not attempt to distinguish be-
205. Id. at 821-22.
206. Id. at 822.
207. Id.
208. Id. Further, Justice O'Connor stated that the Supreme Court of South Carolina was
the most appropriate forum to address Gathers' contention that his death sentence violated
United States Supreme Court precedent because Gathers was not provided an opportunity to
rebut the victim-related evidence. Id. at 822-23.
209. Id. at 821.
210. Id. at 820-21.
211. No Justices joined Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 823-24.
213. Id. To illustrate this point, Justice Scalia gave the example of a victim who was a
model husband and father. In this example, the courts, according to Justice Scalia, would
have difficulty in discerning whether the description of the victim, as a husband and father,
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tween a description of the victim's personal characteristics, and the harm
caused by the defendant to the victim and the victim's family for eighth
amendment purposes.2 14
Confronting the issue of overruling such a recent decision,215 Justice
Scalia noted that the Court was more likely to overrule a prior decision after
a change in the Court's composition.2 16 Moreover, because Booth was a de-
cision based upon the "evolving standards of decency," Justice Scalia urged
the Court to overrule Booth, sooner rather than later, to prevent Booth from
becoming embedded in state and federal law.217 Justice Scalia asserted that
Booth must be overruled immediately to prevent legislators from tailoring
laws to comply with the erroneous decision, and to disrupt the development
of a societal consensus supporting the erroneous decision.2 18 As Justice
Scalia pointed out, once laws are modified and a new consensus is formed,
action by the Court to overturn the decision would be less likely to
succeed.219
VI. THE EXTENSION OF BOOTH V. MARYLAND TO SOUTH CAROLINA V.
GATHERS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Precedent and stare decisis play important roles in the United States' legal
system. 220 The courts rely on these principles to protect rights accruing
under judicial decisions and to promote security and certainty. 221 Neverthe-
less, where a field of law is unsettled, as with the admissibility of victim-
related information in capital cases, many issues remain undecided. The
Court's decision in Gathers implicates, yet leaves unsettled, a myriad of is-
sues, including the differentiation between admissible and inadmissible vic-
tim impact statements and victim-related information, the consideration of
the harm caused by the defendant to the victim and the victim's family in
capital cases, and the future of the victim's role in capital cases.
relates to the victim's personal characteristics or to the harm caused to the victim's family by
the loss of such an individual. Id.
214. Id.
215. The United States Supreme Court decided Booth two years before Gathers.
216. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 824 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
218. Id. at 824-25.
219. Id. Justice Scalia also referred to one of Justice Douglas' works which notes that a
judge must uphold the Constitution and not the " 'gloss which his predecessors may have put
on it.'" Id. at 825 (quoting Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
220. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1176, 1406 (6th ed. 1990). Precedent is defined as the
attempt by courts "to decide cases on the basis of principles established in prior cases." Id. at
1176. Stare decisis is the "[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
point." Id. at 1406.
221. Id. at 1406.
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A. Not All Victim Impact Statements and Victim-related Information are
Detrimental to Capital Punishment Proceedings
In Gathers, the Supreme Court extended the Booth holding, which prohib-
ited the introduction of victim impact statements, to include prohibiting the
introduction of all victim-related information during the sentencing
phase. 22 The Gathers Court took the easy way out by not thoroughly ana-
lyzing the difficulties that victim-related information raises regarding a de-
fendant's eighth amendment rights. In Booth, the victim's family and the
Maryland Division of Parole and Probation composed the victim impact
statement.223 The victim impact statement described the impact of the
murders on the family, and the family's belief that the defendant could not
be rehabilitated.224 In Gathers, the information included a prayer card and a
voter registration card.225 The contents of these cards did not describe the
impact of the crime on the victim or on the victim's family, nor did they
declare that the defendant could not be rehabilitated. Instead, the contents
of the cards constituted information that gave the court a " 'glimpse of the
life' . . . [the] defendant 'chose to extinguish.' ,226 The information in Gath-
ers did not contain the unfairly prejudicial and emotional statements present
in Booth. Nevertheless, the Court declared the information in Gathers suffi-
ciently similar to that in Booth, and drew a deceptive comparison between
apples and oranges.
By eliminating this victim-related information from the sentencer's con-
sideration, the Gathers decision contributes to the one-sided nature of capital
punishment proceedings. 227 The Court repeatedly allows the admission of
information relating to the defendant's background without equal regard for
the victim's background. 22 ' The sentencer must consider information relat-
ing to the defendant's background that is irrelevant to the circumstances of
the crime as a mitigating factor.22 9 Yet, the Supreme Court concluded in
Gathers that the sentencer should not consider victim-related information
that is irrelevant to the circumstances of the crime because of the possibility
222. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-12.
223. Booth v. Maryland, 428 U.S. 496, 498.500 (1987).
224. Id. at 512-13.
225. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 808-10.
226. Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
227. Id. at 817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
228. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 817-18.
229. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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that this information might be unfairly prejudicial.23° This conclusion is un-
fortunate because an informed and individualized sentencing determination
requires consideration of information relating to the backgrounds of both the
defendant and the victim. 23 1 Moreover, such an individualized determina-
tion is especially necessary in the imposition of the death sentence because
the death sentence is so "unique in its severity and irrevocability, '232 and is
such a "profoundly moral [decision] . . . refiect[ing] the moral judgment of
the community., 2
33
The Supreme Court's trend toward focusing exclusively on the defend-
ant's background in sentencing decisions is contrary to the movement in the
United States Congress and most state legislatures to broaden the use of
victim impact statements in sentencing decisions.234 Congress and many
state legislatures implicitly focus on victim characteristics in enacting laws
extending the imposition of the death sentence for crimes where the victim is
the President of the United States, a policeman, or someone holding a deline-
ated governmental position. 235 This legislative movement is indicative of the
public's support for judicial consideration of the personal characteristics of
the victim and the victim's family in capital punishment proceedings.
Although the legislature has spoken regarding the proper consideration of
victim-related information, and the Court traditionally defers to the legisla-
ture on matters related to sentencing, the Court has rejected the use of vic-
tim-related information based on its reading of constitutional limitations.23 6
The constitutional limitations on the Court's deference to the legislature,
with respect to sentencing procedures, arise from the Court's concern that
sentencing procedures be consistent with the eighth amendment.237 In
Booth, the Court declared victim impact statements inadmissible because of
230. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05; see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); supra notes 62-68, 109-12, 187-89 and accompanying text.
231. McLeod, supra note 8, at 506-07. " 'Two lives-the defendant's and the victim's-are
profoundly affected by a criminal sentence. The court cannot make an informed decision on a
just punishment if it hears from only one side.' " Id. (quoting PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME, VICTIMS OF CRIME (1982)).
232. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
233. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 817 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
234. Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 nn. I & 2 (1987) (White, J., dissenting); see supra notes 9, 10,
113-16 and accompanying text.
235. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 n.2 (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 119 and accompany-
ing text.
236. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000-01 (1983)). In
Gregg v. Georgia, the Court stated, "The deference we owe to the decisions of the state legisla-
tures under our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishments is con-
cerned, for 'these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.'" 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976)
(citation omitted) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
237. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
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the possibility that using such statements would lead to arbitrary and capri-
cious sentencing decisions which constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the eighth amendment.238 The Court then extended this reasoning to
apply to the victim-related information in Gathers.239 The elements in the
victim impact statement in Booth that gave rise to the possibility of an arbi-
trary and capricious decision, however, were not present in the information
in Gathers.24' For example, while the victim impact statement in Booth de-
scribed the effects of the murders upon the upcoming wedding in the family
and the daily routine of the victims' family as well as the viciousness of the
murders,241 the victim-related information in Gathers contained only a
prayer and voter registration card. If the Court continues to apply Booth in
the same fashion that it applied the decision in Gathers, the Court will likely
declare even more factual accounts of the victim inadmissible as being viola-
tive of the defendant's eighth amendment rights. 24 2
An alternative to the Court's decision to declare unilaterally all victim
impact statements and victim-related information inadmissible is to evaluate
the admissibility of such statements and information based on the content of
the statement or information. If a victim impact statement advocates a par-
ticular punishment or gives an opinion concerning the defendant's ability to
contribute to society, under Booth the statement would be declared inadmis-
sible. When a victim impact statement only describes the personal charac-
teristics of the victim, the impact of the crime, and the harm caused by the
defendant, however, the statement could be relevant to a sentencer's deci-
sionmaking and, thus, should be admissible. Allowing the sentencer to con-
sider only the latter type of victim impact statements provides the sentencer
with an opportunity to weigh the impact of the defendant's behavior without
causing the sentencer to be prejudicial to the defendant. This permits the
sentencer to make a more informed and individualized sentencing determi-
nation and reduces the one-sided nature of the current sentencing process.243
This content-based alternative presents a compromise between the propo-
nents and opponents of the admissibility of victim impact statements in capi-
238. Id. at 508-09.
239. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989).
240. See supra notes 89-90, 100-04, 161-68, 187-89, 205-08 and accompanying text.
241. Booth, 482 U.S. at 511-13.
242. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). An example of a more factual
account would be a preprinted form which requests information such as the victim's employ-
ment, income, and number of dependents. While this type of form would neither be opinion-
ated, nor advocate a particular sentence for the defendant, the Court would likely declare the
form inadmissible because it is not relevant to the defendant's background.
243. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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tal punishment proceedings, and can be applied to the sentencer's
consideration of victim-related information as well. 2"
B. The Consideration of the Harm Caused by the Defendant to the
Victim and the Victim's Family in Capital Punishment
Proceedings
The harm caused to the victim and the victim's family is a measurement
of the damage caused by the defendant's actions.2 45 Support for the sen-
tencer's consideration of such harm has fluctuated over the years.2 46 In the
past, the courts required that the sentence fit the crime.24 7 Because the judi-
cial system classified crimes according to the amount of harm caused, for
example, attempted murder as opposed to first degree murder, the severity of
sentences was implicitly tailored according to the amount of harm caused by
the defendant.24 More recently, the courts have attempted to make the sen-
tence fit the criminal.24 9 Support is increasing among the courts and legisla-
tures, however, for a return to sentences based upon a weighing of the crime
and the amount of harm caused by the defendant's actions.
2 °
Whether the sentencer should consider the harm caused by the defendant
to the victim and the victim's family during capital punishment proceedings
is an issue which has divided the courts. Some lower courts contend that
the defendant should be held accountable for the harm resulting from his
actions. One reason these courts advance for considering the harm caused
by the defendant is that such harm is considered in non-capital crimes.
2 2
Nevertheless, other lower courts and commentators hold that sentencers en-
244. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 518-19 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated:
To the extent that the Court determines that in [Booth] it was inappropriate to allow
the victims' family to express their opinions on, for example, whether petitioner
could be rehabilitated, that is obviously not an inherent fault in all victim impact
statements and no reason to declare the practice of admitting such statements at
capital sentencing hearings per se unconstitutional.
Id.
245. Nevares-Muniz, supra note 2, at 272-73, 278-79; Schulhofer, supra note 99, at 1498.
246. Ogletree, supra note 45, at 1940-42.
247. Id.
248. Id.; Schulhofer, supra note 99, at 1498-99.
249. Ogletree, supra note 45, at 1940-42.
250. Id.
251. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812-25 (1989) (O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 515-21 (1987) (White, J., and Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
252. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 10, at 207-
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counter too much difficulty in adequately considering the degree of harm
caused by the defendant.25 3
Allowing consideration of the harm caused by the defendant's actions in
sentencing decisions may, in fact, deter crime.2 54  If a potential criminal
knows that a particular sentence will increase in proportion to the amount of
harm caused, that individual might be less likely to commit the more serious
crime. Of course, this assumes that the criminal will weigh the various ex-
pected costs and benefits of particular criminal behavior, and will decide
whether the expected costs, and the expected sentence, outweigh the ex-
pected benefits of the criminal behavior.2 5
Including the degree to which the defendant's actions have harmed the
victim, the victim's family, and society may also increase prosecutorial effi-
ciency and permit individuals to contribute, or at least feel as if they are
contributing, to the sentencing process.256 Prosecutorial efficiency may in-
crease with this revision because the victim and the victim's family would
now have a role in the sentencing decision and would likely cooperate with
the prosecutor. 257 Harm is difficult to measure, however, especially between
people of different religious, social, and economic classes.258 Therefore, lev-
ying an appropriate sentence based upon such information will be even more
difficult. In addition, due to the irrevocable nature of capital punishment,
courts are likely to hesitate to consider such a subjective factor in the sen-
259tencing process.
253. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 823 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 10, at 207-10.
No objective standard exists for the measuring harm caused.. Therefore, considering the harm
caused during sentencing may lead to an arbitrarily imposed death sentence. Comment, supra
note 10, at 208.
254. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 819-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Punishment has a two-fold
deterrence on crime: it prevents the convicted criminal from committing more crimes, and it
deters other potential criminals. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, § 5, at 24; H. GROSS, supra
note 46, at 394-400; Comment, supra note 10, at 215.
255. Comment, supra note 10, at 215; see supra note 46.
256. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, I., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the rule in
Booth was inappropriate because society clearly desires more attention to "victim's rights" as
seen in the actions of the state legislatures. Therefore, this was not a question for the Court,
but rather for the legislatures which are more likely to incorporate the views of the people. Id.;
see also Comment, supra note 10, at 216 ("A victim may be more willing to cooperate to the
fullest with the prosecution of the defendant if he knows he will have a role at sentencing.").
257. This cooperation makes the prosecutor more efficient and increases the probability
that a punishment will be imposed. The potential criminal sees this increase in the probability
of punishment as a higher expected cost of committing the crime, and therefore, is deterred.
See Comment, supra note 10, at 216.
258. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
259. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). "When a defendant's life is at stake, the
Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed." Id. (citing
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C. The Future of the Victim's Role in Capital Sentencing
The future of the prohibition of victim impact statements and victim-re-
lated information in capital sentencing depends on a number of factors, in-
cluding the lower courts' interpretation of Gathers, 2  the composition of the
Supreme Court, and state and federal legislative sentiment toward the ad-
missibility of such statements. 26' Because of possible changes in the Court
and in legislation permitting victim-related information, the victim's role in
capital sentencing could become more significant.
1. Changes in Judicial Decisions
Before the United States Supreme Court decision in Gathers, the lower
courts disagreed over whether to admit information regarding the victim's
personal characteristics in the capital sentencing phase.262 This confusion is
likely to continue even after Gathers. Already, some lower courts have held
a victim's personal characteristics admissible when the probative value of the
information outweighed its prejudicial effect, and when such characteristics
were relevant to the circumstances of the crime.26 3 Other lower courts have
held that the eighth amendment must be strictly applied as in Gathers,2"
and that victim-related information is irrelevant to capital punishment pro-
ceedings.265 The reactions of the lower courts to the Booth and Gathers deci-
sions demonstrate that some of the lower courts either do not fully
understand the scope of Booth and Gathers, or do not agree with the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in the two cases.
The composition of the Supreme Court is also important for determining
the future use of victim impact statements and victim-related information in
capital punishment proceedings. The Supreme Court in Booth and Gathers
was split five to four against the introduction of victim-related informa-
tion.266 Justices Powell and Brennan delivered the opinions of the Court in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71 (1932)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 n.34 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
260. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
261. See infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
263. People v. Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291, 336-37, 777 P.2d 121, 149, 261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 376
(1989) modified, 49 Cal. 3d 956 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1938 (1990); see also State v.
Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 104, 117-18, 381 S.E.2d 609, 622-23 (1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 1465
(1990). In Laws, the court upheld the prosecutor's references to the victims as "alcoholics"
and "street people," which were made during the sentencing phase, on the grounds that the
references were an "admonition to the jury to uphold the law, regardless of any prejudices it
might have." Laws, 325 N.C. at 104, 381 D.E. 2d at 622-23.
264. State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 266 n.8, 562 A.2d 1060, 1064 n.8 (1989).
265. Jackson v. Dugger, 547 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 1989).
266. See supra notes 12, 24 and accompanying text.
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Booth and Gathers, respectively. Since then, Justices Powell and Brennan
have retired, and Justices Kennedy and Souter have been appointed to the
Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented
in both Booth and Gathers, and were joined by Justice White in Booth and
Justice Kennedy in Gathers.267
The split decisions in Booth and Gathers reveal an ideological division in
the Court between recently appointed Justices and senior Justices.268 With
the appointment of Justice Souter to the Court and the Court's desire to
reevaluate victim-related information269 the Court might pull back from the
blanket prohibition advanced under Booth and Gathers.270
2. Changes in Legislation
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 provided victims with a
greater role in the criminal justice system by acting as model legislation for
state legislatures.27' The Act, among other things, amended the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to include victim impact statements as a part of
the presentence report.2 72 While this Act was a significant step forward for
267. Justice White concurred in Gathers stating: "Unless Booth is to be overruled, the
judgment below must be affirmed. Hence, I join Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court."
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) (White, J., concurring). Justice White
might be saying that, although he believed the Court should overrule Booth, the majority of the
Court disagreed, and his only alternative was to follow Court precedent. It is interesting that
Justice White did not file a dissenting opinion or join in one of the dissenting opinions.
268. In Booth, the dissent was composed of justices appointed after 1971 with the exception
of Justice White; Justice Stevens, appointed in 1975, joined the majority. In Gathers, the dis-
sent was composed of justices appointed after 1971. Justice Stevens joined the majority. But
see Powell, Myths and Misconceptions About the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT
AND iTs JusTicEs 202, 206-07 (J. Choper ed. 1987) (Former Justice Powell stated that there
are no "blocs" or "discords" among the justices); Goldwater, Political Philosophy and Supreme
Court Justices, in THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 222, 234-35 (J. Choper ed. 1987)
(Former Senator Barry Goldwater stating that one cannot tell how a Justice will vote once
appointed to the Court).
269. 51 Ohio St. 3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (1990), cert. granted, Il1 S. Ct. 39 (1990). The
United States Supreme Court decided to reevaluate the Booth and Gathers decisions by grant-
ing certiorari in Payne v. Tennessee. No. 90-5721 (U.S. Feb. 15, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, US file). Oral argument is scheduled for April 1991.
270. See Tribe, What Difference Can a Justice or Two Make?, in THE SUPREME COURT
AND ITS JUSTICES 236-44 (J. Choper ed. 1987). Lawrence Tribe discussed the effect of a
change in the composition of the court on five to four decisions. Tribe concluded that a change
of only one justice will have an impact upon previous five-to-four decisions. He stated that
appointing one justice at a time may make a difference, but the impact is usually both progres-
sive and conservative depending upon the issues. In addition, a "catalytic" justice could take
control of the Court, negating any effect the newly appointed justice may have. Id.
271. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
272. Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 3, 96 Stat. 1248, 1249 (1982).
Catholic University Law Review
victims' rights, state and federal legislatures can do more to protect these
rights.
In particular, future legislation, unlike the Act, could expressly state that
the sentencer should consider victim-related information. Although the
courts will probably hold such legislation unconstitutional, the courts might
uphold the legislation on grounds that "appropriate sentencing considera-
tions are 'peculiarly questions of legislative policy.' "273 To limit the chances
of judicial nullification, future legislation should be carefully drafted, reduc-
ing the likelihood that victim-related information would inflame the sen-
tencer, and cause the sentencer to render a decision based on caprice or
emotion. For example, the legislation could specifically delineate what infor-
mation the victim impact statement can contain, such as the victim's em-
ployment, income, and number of dependents. Whatever the form,
legislation is necessary to further the rights of victims in the criminal justice
system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a
sentence be proportional to the crime committed and that an individualized
sentencing determination be made by the sentencer in capital punishment
proceedings. The courts must closely scrutinize the information that the
sentencer considers in imposing the death sentence. The United States
Supreme Court held in Booth v. Maryland that victim impact statements are
not admissible during the sentencing phase of capital punishment proceed-
ings because the statements may lead the jury to impose a death sentence
arbitrarily and capriciously. The Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Gath-
ers extended this holding to declare victim-related information inadmissible
during the sentencing phase of capital punishment proceedings.
The Court grappled with numerous sensitive and difficult issues regarding
victim impact statements and victim-related information in Booth and Gath-
ers. Although the victim-related information at issue in Gathers lacked some
of the subjective and biased views found in the victim impact statement in
Booth, the Court considered the information inadmissible because the vic-
tim-related information did not focus on the defendant, and because the in-
troduction of such information might lead to an arbitrary sentencing
decision. For the same reasons, the Court was reluctant to include an evalu-
273. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502, 515 (1987) (White, J., dissenting at 515) (citing
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983) and quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393 (1958)).
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ation of the harm caused by the defendant to the victim and the victim's
family as a sentencing consideration.
While Booth and Gathers are not representative of the current actions
taken by the federal and state legislatures, the Court followed closely the
constitutional limitations on sentencing procedures under the eighth amend-
ment. Despite the Court's decision in Gathers, disagreement remains over
the proper interpretation of the eighth amendment, and confusion exists
among the lower courts concerning the admissibility of victim impact state-
ments and victim-related information. In terms of judicial precedent, how-
ever, the Court has solidified its position against the admissibility of victim
impact statements and victim-related information during the sentencing
phase of capital punishment proceedings. Although victim impact state-
ments and victim-related information could potentially contribute to capital
punishment proceedings by allowing the sentencer to consider the victim in
the sentencing process, the Court, at least for the present, has decided that
the value of such information is overshadowed by the possibility of arbitrar-
ily imposed death sentences.
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